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A Tale of an Ambitious City that Failed to Fulfill its Global Vision
 
José Miguel Fernández-Güell
For nearly two decades, Madrid followed a very aggressive strategy to 
position itself at the top of the global city rankings. This strategy was 
primarily focused on building large transport infrastructures and promoting 
urban megaprojects so as to make the city attractive to investors, companies, 
tourists and citizens alike. At the beginning of the 21st century, the strategy 
seemed to be working, fuelled by an unprecedented favorable economic 
context. However, this was just an illusion. In reality, Madrid’s development 
model was plagued with excesses and imbalances, which became quite 
evident after the eruption of the 2007–2008 economic crisis and left multiple 
economic, social and physical scars on the city, which will require not only 
time to heal, but also courageous policy initiatives. This paper describes 
Madrid’s ambitions during the golden years of high economic growth and 
unparalleled building sprees, exposes the effects of the economic recession 
on the urban fabric, explores future development opportunities and suggests 
urban policies for the city’s comeback.
Fig. 1: Municipality of Madrid.
(Source: Ayuntamiento de 
Madrid, 2012)
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
os
é M
igu
el 
Fe
rn
án
de
z-G
üe
ll]
 at
 05
:00
 15
 Ju
ne
 20
14
 
City-Tour
disP 196 · 50.1 (1/2014) 7Understanding Madrid and its Context
A brief overview of recent developments, the 
present situation and future prospects of a me-
tropolis like Madrid, which is physically large, 
socially heterogeneous and economically di-
verse, is not an easy endeavor. Nevertheless, the 
case of Madrid can be intriguing to a foreign 
observer because its immediate past has been 
full of excesses, its present is dominated by a 
deep recession, and its future is faced with ma-
jor challenges and uncertainties.
Under these premises – and from a personal 
perspective based on several years of consulting 
practice with Madrid-related projects – this es-
say sets out the ambitions, troubles and expec-
tations of the Spanish capital in the last twenty 
years. The sequence of events is organized into 
three periods. First, the golden years of high 
economic growth and an unparalleled building 
spree are analyzed and assessed. Second, the 
economic recession and its aftermath are forth-
rightly exposed. Finally, future prospects for the 
metropolis are explored and some suggestions 
for policymakers are given.
Before starting the analysis, some clues 
about the nature, limitations and general con-
text of Madrid should be given. First of all, the 
city is the political capital of the nation but, at 
the same time, it is also the capital of an au-
tonomous region with comprehensive political 
powers. The 8,028 km2 Madrid Region is in the 
center of the Iberian Peninsula and has a popu-
lation of 6.49 million inhabitants. Although the 
region only occupies 1.6% of the national terri-
tory, it accounts for 13.8% of the Spanish popu-
lation and generates 19.6% of the gross national 
product (Comunidad de Madrid 2013).
Within the region, the municipality of Ma-
drid occupies 604.3 km2, holds 3.23 million 
inhabitants and generates 11.7% of the gross 
national product (Ayuntamiento de Madrid 
2013a). At the European level, Madrid is the 
third largest urban agglomeration after the Ile 
de France and Greater London. Despite its vig-
orous growth since the late 1990s, the city has 
managed to preserve large natural areas and ur-
ban parks within its limits thanks to the main-
tenance of a highly compact dense urban fabric 
(Figure 1).
To properly understand the city’s spatial and 
socio-economic transformation, we must look 
beyond its political boundaries. In fact, Madrid 
is the center of a functional urban region that 
extends into cities such as Guadalajara and 
Toledo, which are located outside the limits 
of the Madrid Region. Therefore, the regional, 
metropolitan and municipal statistics are used 
either way to explain the evolution of the city.
Madrid lacks the strong, distinctive socio-
cultural identity that other Spanish cities, such 
as Barcelona and Bilbao, can project to outsid-
ers. This can be evaluated as both a weakness 
and an asset. On the one hand, a strong identity 
reinforces the social capital and tends to pull 
citizens together in search of a common goal, 
which is missing in Madrid. On the other hand, 
this missing attribute opens up the city to for-
eigners and increases Madrid’s cosmopolitan 
atmosphere.
Lastly, Madrid has to attend to two major 
roles, which are sometimes contradictory. One 
is that, as a capital city, it must provide a whole 
range of services to a country with very distinc-
tive regional features, while also leading the de-
velopment of a relatively small region that com-
petes at the national and international level.
A City in Search of a Global Position
Since the 1990s, Madrid’s politicians and eco-
nomic agents have been transfixed with the idea 
of placing the city at the top of the global urban 
hierarchy. This obsession may well have started 
in 1989 when the famous French study on 165 
European agglomerations was published and 
widely distributed on the continent (Brunet 
1989). This study had considerable media im-
pact as it was the first appearance of a com-
prehensible breakdown of the continent’s city 
hierarchy. It also identified the “backbone” of 
European development, popularly known as the 
“Blue Banana”, where most decisions are still 
taken and productive forces are concentrated 
(Faludi 2010).
The French analysis placed London and 
Paris in the first category, Milan in the second 
category, and Madrid in the third group, to-
gether with Munich, Frankfurt, Rome, Brussels, 
Barcelona and Amsterdam. Madrid was also in 
a peripheral position with regard to the Euro-
pean backbone. This study caught the attention 
of Madrid’s stakeholders, who felt that the city 
should climb up the European urban hierarchy. 
This belief was reflected in several planning 
documents in the following years.
During the early 1990s, Madrid drafted a 
strategic plan (PROMADRID 1993) that pur-
sued a consensus amongst public officials and 
socio-economic stakeholders about the vision 
that should guide the city’s future development. 
Although the plan was never implemented as 
originally intended, many of its strategies pre-
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8 disP 196 · 50.1 (1/2014) vailed in the coming years in the minds and 
agendas of politicians and economic agents. 
A brief account of that strategic vision follows.
First and foremost, Madrid wished to enter 
the prime league of global cities by becoming a 
financial, advanced services and decision-mak-
ing hub for Southern Europe. The undeclared 
goal of the Spanish capital was first to get even 
with and later surpass cities like Barcelona, Lis-
bon, Rome and Milan. Once its position was 
consolidated in the Mediterranean Arc, Madrid 
would then try to get closer to the top rank en-
joyed by London and Paris.
In order to fulfill this ambitious objective, 
among other things Madrid needed to become 
an airport hub for flights coming to Europe 
from Latin America and Africa. Obviously, a 
powerful airport hub would be a prerequisite 
to transform Madrid into a first rate logistics 
center, which in turn would attract additional 
economic activities. High-frequency air con-
nections would also stimulate tourism and help 
to increase the city’s cosmopolitan character.
At the national level, Madrid wanted to be-
come the integrating link between Spain’s ur-
ban system and the European Union. This goal 
was to be achieved through a high-speed rail-
way system. Madrid would be converted into 
the hub of a radio-concentric system that would 
provide high-speed connections to most Span-
ish cities. Even major Portuguese cities were to 
be integrated into this system. Thanks to this 
network, anyone living in a coastal city could 
travel to the capital in just three hours and on 
to Barajas airport, with its wide choice of inter-
national flights.
In addition to providing an excellent level of 
transport accessibility, Madrid also needed to 
build large facilities in order to become a sci-
entific and technological pole, an attractive cul-
tural and tourist destination, a city known for 
its quality of life and a cosmopolitan metropo-
lis receptive to new trends and ideas. These 
goals would require large public investments to 
develop technological facilities, build sophisti-
cated museums, increase office space and im-
prove public zones.
To implement these objectives, the city 
needed to satisfy three key conditions: a fa-
vorable economic context, a friendly planning 
framework for urban development, and a man-
agerial political style to push complex proj-
ects forward. The first condition was met from 
1997 onwards, when Spain enjoyed an unprec-
edented economic bonanza thanks to its entry 
to the Eurozone and the provision of very cheap 
financing. During this period, the country was 
the recipient of large amounts of international 
capital seeking high returns from a booming 
economy.
The second condition was also met when 
a new city plan was approved in 1997. Under 
Spanish legislation, a city plan is the central in-
strument for guiding urban development and 
assigning building rights. The objectives of the 
new plan were well aligned with the ambitious 
strategic vision pursued by the city (Ayunta-
miento de Madrid 1997): facilitate urban growth 
in order to minimize real estate speculation, re-
lease new land for business activities, regen-
erate the historical district, build emblematic 
projects to reinforce Madrid’s capital role, and 
develop an infrastructure program to support 
the transformation process.
The third condition was met under the po-
litical leadership of Ruiz-Gallardón, President 
of the Madrid Regional Government from 1996 
to 2002 and Mayor of Madrid from 2003 to 
2011. Gallardón was clearly determined to build 
large, complex urban projects before the end 
of his political terms in order to ensure his re-
election and project himself onto the national 
political arena. This strategy required resolute 
power brokers and competent technical teams 
capable of executing very large and complex 
projects in record times. By the same token, 
these costly projects also required large finan-
cial resources, which were happily met by the 
Spanish financial system. Consequently, all the 
enabling factors were set for promoting a devel-
opment spree in the city.
Reliance on Infrastructures  
and Megaprojects
The transformation strategy followed by Madrid 
during the period from 1997-2007 was heavily 
based on building large transport infrastruc-
tures and urban megaprojects. The city strove 
to overcome its peripheral position in the Eu-
ropean Union and emerge as an international 
reference point in urban culture by upgrading 
its external accessibility and modernizing its 
urban fabric. In turn, Madrid was expected to 
gain critical mass by attracting more residents 
and economic activity to its urban realm. The 
following initiatives are illustrative examples of 
this strategy.
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disP 196 · 50.1 (1/2014) 9Extension of the metropolitan  
highway system 
In the last 25 years, Madrid has built an ex-
tensive radio-concentric highway network that 
provides greater accessibility and mobility to 
the entire metropolitan area (Figure 2). Four 
ring roads, (M-30, M-40, M-45 and M-50), are 
intersected by twelve radial highways that con-
nect Madrid to the rest of the country. This 
expensive and environmentally intrusive high-
way infrastructure has nevertheless provided 
reasonably good mobility to a highly complex 
urban region.
Enlargement of Barajas Airport 
In 2006, Terminal 4, a huge building designed 
by Richard Rogers and Lamela Architects 
(Figure 3), was completed and two new run-
ways were added to the existing Barajas Airport. 
With this new infrastructure, Madrid’s airport 
can now handle up to 70 million passengers a 
year. Although the airport enlargement has cre-
ated an acoustic impact on some nearby resi-
dential areas, this infrastructure is considered 
to be a big asset for the city because of its large 
capacity and its convenient railway and metro 
connections to the business district.
Fig. 2: Madrid highway network.
(Source: Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2012a)
Fig. 3: Terminal 4 of Barajas Airport.
(Source: Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 
photo collection)
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10 disP 196 · 50.1 (1/2014) Growth of the high-speed rail system
The high-speed strategy followed in Spain has 
definitely benefited Madrid. Nearly 3,000 kilo-
meters of high-speed track are organized in a 
radial pattern with Madrid as the central hub. 
Recently, criticism has emerged concerning 
the large public investments dedicated to the 
high-speed network – to the detriment of other 
transport infrastructures. Despite the economic 
and political debates, high-speed trains are very 
popular among travelers and have become a 
fearsome competitor to air transport on the 
Peninsula.
Improvement of the public transport system
In the last 20 years, Madrid has made a signifi-
cant effort to upgrade its public transport sys-
tem. Presently, Madrid has 10 regional railway 
lines with 100 stations that annually transport 
more than 180 million passengers (Renfe 2013), 
while the metro system has 300 stations and 293 
kilometers of lines that moved nearly 602 mil-
lion passengers in 2012 (Metro de Madrid 2013). 
The combination of the regional railways and 
the metro system is an acceptable car substitute 
for hundreds of thousands of daily commuters.
Madrid-Rio project
By far the most expensive and ambitious project 
recently undertaken by the city is Madrid-Río 
(Figure 4). From 2003 to 2007, nearly 25 kilo-
meters of the M-30 along the Manzanares River 
were moved underground and large spaces 
were freed from highway traffic. As a result, a 
large linear park was created and the riverfront 
area was reclaimed for the citizens. Madrid-
Río was finished in 2011 and was almost im-
mediately a great success among the residents 
of congested neighborhoods nearby, who ea-
gerly enjoyed the new recreational facilities. 
However, the city will be heavily indebted for 
many years to come because of this expensive 
project.
Construction of a new business center
By 2009, four imposing 58-story skyscrapers 
were completed and stood ready in the exten-
sion of Castellana Avenue to house Madrid’s 
new business center (Figure 5). Their location 
seemed just right because of their close prox-
imity to Chamartin’s railway station and its ex-
cellent connection with Barajas airport. Never-
theless, the towers, finished when the “bonanza” 
was coming to an end, now with many vacant of-
fices, are waiting for a new growth cycle.
Urban renewal
Significant efforts have been made to embark 
on an integral rehabilitation of historical dis-
tricts and run-down neighborhoods. Not only 
have 17th and 18th century quarters been reno-
vated (Figure 6), the early 20th century Gran 
Vía district has also been restored and brought 
Fig. 4: Madrid-Rio.
(Source: Ayuntamiento de 
Madrid, photo collection)
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Fig. 5: New business center  
on Castellana Avenue.
(Source: Ayuntamiento de 
Madrid, photo collection)
Fig. 6: Historical district reha-
bilitation.
(Source: Ayuntamiento de 
Madrid, photo collection)
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12 disP 196 · 50.1 (1/2014)
back as one of Madrid most popular entertain-
ment areas (Figure 7). Likewise, vast spaces in 
central areas have been reclaimed from the 
automobile for pedestrians in order to revital-
ize shopping and leisure activities. Renewal has 
indeed contributed to improving the quality of 
life in the heart of the bustling metropolis, but 
it has also ignited a gentrification process that 
has yet to be assessed.
This short-list of urban and regional proj-
ects gives an overall idea of the scope and mag-
Fig. 8: Madrid Region’s income 
per capita in Euros (2005–2012).
(Source: INE, 2013b)
Fig. 9: Madrid Region’s un-
employment rate (2005–2012).
(Source: INE, 2013c)
Fig. 10: Madrid municipal 
fiscal debt in millions of Euros 
(2000–2012).
(Source: Ayuntamiento de 
Madrid, 2013b)
Fig. 11: Passenger traffic at  
Barajas Airport (2000–2012).
(Source: AENA, 2013)
Fig. 7: Gran Via rehabilitation.
(Source: Ayuntamiento de 
Madrid, photo collection)
nitude of public and private investments during 
the 1997–2007 period aimed at pushing Madrid 
up in the global hierarchy. In fact, just before 
the onset of the economic crisis, there were 
several signals indicating that somehow these 
gargantuan investments were paying off. Some 
global city rankings were placing Madrid in the 
top categories as an “alpha city” (GaWC 2008), 
and an updated French study of European ag-
glomerations ranked the Spanish capital along-
side Milan and Amsterdam (DATAR 2003). In 
the Iberian context, by the beginning of the 21st 
century, Madrid was enjoying an undisputed 
dominance over the Spanish and Portuguese 
urban systems.
Official statistics also showed Madrid’s ris-
ing fortunes. The building spree and frenzied 
economic activity was accompanied by a slight 
increase in Madrid’s population, fed by immi-
gration flows that reversed the declining trend 
of previous decades (INE 2013a). Madrid’s per 
capita income also rose to the top of Spanish 
cities and came closer to the ranks of the most 
prosperous European metropolises (Figure 8). 
Lastly, the real estate sector joined the party 
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disP 196 · 50.1 (1/2014) 13by building more than 500,000 dwellings in 
the Madrid Region between 2001 and 2011 
(Del Río 2013). Definitively, by 2007 Madrid 
was the center of media attention because of 
its economic momentum and urban mega-
projects. However, the success was built on 
weak foundations.
Exposure of a Fragile and Questionable 
Urban Model
In the summer of 2007, after the collapse of 
the subprime market, nobody in Madrid’s mu-
nicipal government anticipated that the coming 
crisis was going to have such a long, vicious and 
powerful impact on the city’s development am-
bitions. By the end of 2008, after the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy, Madrid became fully 
aware that both its national and local econo-
mies were facing serious problems due to struc-
tural weaknesses that had been ignored during 
the previous growth years.
Since then, the trends in economic indica-
tors have been devastating. Madrid Region’s per 
capita income has declined from 30,944 euros 
in 2008 to 29,385 in 2012 (Figure 8) and its 
unemployment rate has skyrocketed from 6% 
in 2007 to almost 19% in 2012 (Figure 9). The 
city’s fiscal debt has risen from 1,033 million 
euros in 2001 to 7,430 million euros in 2012 
(Figure 10). As a matter of fact, Madrid has be-
come the most indebted Spanish city in both 
absolute and per capita terms. Airport traffic in 
Barajas has decreased nearly 15% since 2007, 
leaving the brand new Terminal 4 worryingly 
underused (Figure 11). Lastly, real estate value 
for residential uses has decreased by 30% on 
average since 2007 (INE 2013d).
As a result of the enduring crisis, the city 
has many visible scars in its urban fabric. Large 
urbanized areas remain empty because there is 
no demand for real estate products, unfinished 
building structures can be seen in several sites 
in the metropolitan area, brand new tollways 
carry much less traffic than planned, and sev-
eral urban megaprojects, such as Operación 
Chamartín and Operación Campamento, have 
been put on hold because of the real estate 
meltdown.
From the environmental point of view, the 
Madrid Region has followed an aggressive ur-
banization model characterized by the over-
construction of infrastructures, housing and 
business facilities. Despite trying to preserve a 
compact city model, rapid growth in the met-
ropolitan area has inevitably increased urban 
sprawl, the duration of commuter trips, the de-
mand for motorized mobility, suburban shop-
ping and leisure centers, as well as the envi-
ronmental impact generated by an intrusive 
network of heavy transport infrastructures.
The crisis is not only visible from strictly 
economic and spatial perspectives, but has also 
shown a relevant social dimension. The popu-
larly known 15-M Movement emerged in Ma-
drid on May 15, 2011 at a public demonstration 
against the adverse effects of the economic cri-
sis. For 28 consecutive days, citizens camped in 
Puerta del Sol Square, the very heart of Madrid, 
to protest against the crisis and the recovery 
policies imposed on people by the Spanish gov-
ernment, the European Union and multilateral 
organizations. Citizens were disenchanted, in-
dignant and resentful about the misuses carried 
out by the political and economic branches. The 
pacifist 15-M Movement demanded a more par-
ticipative democratic system to prevent public 
corruption and political malpractice.
In brief, it can be said that in Madrid “the 
streets were not paved with gold,” a reminis-
cence of Ken Auletta’s book about New York’s 
decline in the 1970s (Auletta 1980). A frag-
ile, questionable urban model was exposed in 
the aftermath of the crisis. In economic terms, 
the city was excessively dependent on construc-
tion and on service sectors focused on the lo-
cal market, while it lacked a stronger focus on 
high-tech sectors oriented towards the global 
markets. The crisis thus unraveled in a vicious 
circle: the real estate market crashed, the finan-
cial sector became entrapped, the construction 
sector collapsed, industrial output decreased, 
unemployment went up, consumption went 
down, fiscal revenues diminished, social needs 
augmented, fiscal debt skyrocketed, and so on. 
To make matters worse, in September 2013 Ma-
drid failed in its bid to host the Olympic Games 
for a third time in a row, another sign of the 
city’s declining image.
Hope and Future Challenges after  
the Building Hangover
Confronted with such a gloomy picture, it is 
timely to ask whether there is hope for Madrid 
in the near future. At the time this article was 
written, Madrid had yet to achieve financial sta-
bility and economic activities had not recovered 
from the recession. It is thus difficult to predict 
whether the exit from the crisis will take place 
in the shorter or longer term. Nevertheless, sev-
eral reasons give grounds for hope. 
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14 disP 196 · 50.1 (1/2014) First, Madrid has invested heavily in large 
infrastructures and buildings that are either 
idle or have a low occupancy rate. Thus, the 
Spanish capital has an oversupply of brand new 
physical assets that provide a competitive edge 
over other European metropolis with limited 
capacity for urban growth.
Second, Madrid has a diversified indus-
trial fabric, a large concentration of advanced 
services as well as a broad range of techno-
logical spaces. In fact, the city has developed 
an emerging network of clusters in the aero-
space, ICT, automobile, biology, renewable 
energy, health sciences, logistics and financial 
services industries (Madrid Network 2013). 
With the right stimulus, a new generation of 
entrepreneurs and scientists may be able to 
lead the transformation of the city’s economy 
into a vibrant set of innovative industrial and 
service activities.
Third, the City of Madrid has recently drawn 
up two strategic documents that are clearly con-
cerned with the city’s future. The first one Ciu-
dad Madrid 2020 acknowledges the adverse ef-
fects of the economic crisis on the city and 
proposes a new development model (Ayunta-
miento de Madrid 2011). The second document 
is a strategic plan for the international position-
ing of the city that aims to attract more invest-
ments, events and tourists (Ayuntamiento de 
Madrid 2012b). To a large extent, the successful 
implementation of these initiatives depends on 
the support of politicians and the involvement 
of economic stakeholders.
Finally, Madrid has a new city plan underway 
that will guide future urban development. Fully 
aware of past urban excesses and improper pol-
icies, the new plan aims to give Madrid better 
economic opportunities and make it more sus-
tainable, more socially cohesive, and improve 
its quality of life (Infanzón 2013). If these gen-
eral objectives are properly developed and im-
plemented, they may become the starting point 
for a change in urban policies.
Despite these assets and initiatives, there 
are still many uncertainties about the foresee-
able future of the Spanish capital. Assuming the 
best possible scenario for the city, a number of 
suggestions can be made for Madrid to take full 
advantage of the emerging opportunities and 
therefore make an effective resurgence.
1. Ignore the global race: For the time being, a 
more humble and pragmatic vision is needed. 
Madrid should not strive to become an Alpha 
Global City like London, New York or Tokyo. 
In the first place, Madrid will never get to chal-
lenge these cities, and secondly, the economic 
gains of becoming a global city will not com-
pensate for social, environmental and gover-
nance losses. 
2. Turn from megaprojects to human talent: In-
stead of investing in huge infrastructures and 
urban megaprojects, the city should pay more 
attention to promoting and incubating talent. 
Madrid needs to attract the best and most cre-
ative people worldwide to work in advanced in-
dustrial and services sectors. These people ob-
viously respond to financial incentives, but they 
also expect a high quality of life in the form of 
cultural activities (Florida 2005).
3. Promote innovative economic activities: 
From the economic point of view, a two-fold 
strategy should be implemented. On the one 
hand, existing clusters such as financial and 
consulting services, aeronautical industries 
and logistics industries should be made more 
competitive. On the other, support should be 
given to innovative sectors such as biotechnol-
ogy, nanotechnology, hybrid technologies or 
advanced materials.
4. Decentralize urban growth: The capital city 
should be generous and share its prosperity 
with neighboring urban centers. An intelligent 
economic decentralization policy should be 
pursued based on the high-speed railway net-
work built in recent years. To avoid increasing 
congestion and environmental deterioration, 
Madrid should form a well-articulated urban 
system in a 100-kilometer radius that can ac-
commodate homes and economic activities.
5. Recharge underused assets: More sustain-
able development should be pursued in the city 
and its hinterland. Underused infrastructures 
and facilities should be filled with new activi-
ties or recycled in order to avoid consuming 
more land and natural resources. Urban regen-
eration should be given top priority versus new 
developments.
6. Shift from emblematic architecture to small-
scale urban operations: Austerity and sustain-
ability get along better with small-scale oper-
ations than with fancy architectural projects. 
Instead of promoting expensive iconic build-
ings, the municipality should focus on improv-
ing public spaces, public transport and public 
housing.
7. Innovate in planning: Contemporary cities 
are plagued with complexity and uncertainty. 
To operate successfully in this context, cities 
should roll out innovative planning approaches 
based on future studies, strategic thinking, in-
tegrated planning (social, economic, environ-
mental and spatial) and flexible implementa-
tion mechanisms. Madrid should overcome 
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push planning innovation forward.
8. Develop an advanced governance system. 
Politicians should not be allowed to impose 
grandiose, unfeasible projects without being 
accountable to a wide spectrum of stakeholders 
and citizens. Moreover, efficiency should not be 
used as the flagship argument to justify the lack 
of consultation processes. Critical urban deci-
sions should therefore be taken in a more trans-
parent, collaborative and participative mode.
The fulfillment of these requisites is by 
no means an easy endeavor. However, strong 
guidelines have to be provided if past mistakes 
are not to be repeated. As in any contempo-
rary city, Madrid faces challenges and optional 
strategies that have to be resolved in a tricky 
equation: exploit economic opportunities + in-
crease quality of life + guarantee a sustainable 
environment + improve urban governance = the 
best possible scenario. The way these, some-
times contradictory, objectives are combined 
and balanced will be the key to a promising or 
disappointing future.
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